Ostranenie: to give back the sensation of life by Berlina, Alexandra
Ostranenie: To Give Back the 
Sensation of Life
Ostranênie: para devolver a 
sensação de vida
Autor: Alexandra Berlina
Edição: RUS Vol. 11. No  16  
Data: Setembro 2020
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2317-4765.rus.2020.168820
Ostranenie: To Give 
Back the Sensation 
of Life
Alexandra Berlina*
Abstract: The present article studies Shklovsky’s 
idea of emotional and cognitive renewal of 
the habitual – ostranenie – alongside cognate 
concepts in psychology and cognitive studies. 
It redefines ostranenie not as a device (as 
commonly accepted in literary studies), but as 
a cognitive/psychological effect, and suggests 
the term “extratextual ostranenie” to refer to 
the feeling one has when the usual becomes 
seemingly strange – and at the same time 
more rather than less emotionally relevant.  
As for literary ostranenie, even when it is 
created though characters who feel alienated 
or depersonalized, the readers’ experience is 
exactly the opposite experience – emotional 
reconnection to the world. 
Resumo: O presente artigo aborda a ideia de 
renovação cognitiva e emocional do habitual – 
ostraniénie –, de Viktor Chklóvski, juntamente 
com conceitos semelhantes advindos da 
Psicologia e dos Estudos Cognitivos. O artigo 
redefine ostraniénie não como um procedimento 
(como normalmente aceito nos estudos 
literários), mas como um efeito cognitivo/
psicológico; também sugere a criação da 
expressão “ostraniénie extratextual” para se 
referir ao sentimento que se tem quando o usual 
se torna aparentemente estranho – e, ao mesmo 
tempo, mais ao invés de menos relevante 
emocionalmente. Quanto ao estranhamento 
(ostraniénie) literário, mesmo quando ele é 
produzido por meio de personagens que se 
sentem alienados ou despersonalizados, a 
experiência do leitor é exatamente o oposto da 
do personagem – o leitor vive uma reconexão 
emocional com o mundo.
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Palavras-chave: Ostraniénie; de Chklóvski; Literatura comparada; Estudos cognitivos  
45
Ostranenie: To give back the sensation of life
I. Ostranenie: a Cognitive Refresher
One hundred years ago, in 1917, a Russian literary scholar 
– or, rather, first-year-student – named Viktor Shklovsky pu-
blished a paper entitled “Art as Device.”1 Though the article 
is so old and its author was so young, the concept of making 
things strange that he called ostranenie might prove helpful 
to psychologists and cognitive scientists today. In fact, it is 
already doing so, but to a much lesser extent than it could, 
and often without any awareness of Shklovsky’s work. Ha-
ving first been mainly used in Slavic literary studies, ostrane-
nie marched on, enriching the studies of different literatures, 
of cinema, and, to a lesser degree, of other arts. Its basis in 
human emotion and cognition makes it especially useful for 
comparative research, as it can be easily applied across dis-
ciplines and cultures. A stronger connection to the cognitive 
field would make the ostranenie even more productive. In the 
following, I will delineate the concept and propose an approa-
ch that could be useful in the study of human cognition and 
emotion (section 1). After alerting the reader to some termino-
logical pitfalls (2), the article will deal with cognate concepts 
in psychology and cognitive studies (3). 
Shklovsky’s concept began as a psychological one: it was ins-
pired by Lev Tolstoy’s observation, made in the late 19th cen-
tury, that habitual actions disappear from conscious memory. 
He cites Tolstoy: “I was dusting in the room; having come full 
circle, I approached the sofa and could not remember if I had 
dusted it off or not. I couldn’t because these movements are 
routine and not conscious, and I felt I never could remember 
it”.2 Instead of being glad to have so much head space cleared 
up for writing, Tolstoy was dismayed at the loss of reality in-
duced by automatism: “if the whole life of many people is lived 
1 The article was first translated into English as “Art as Technique”; this translation exhibits 
an array of misunderstandings. Presently, I used the title as translated by Sher (1991) and 
myself (Berlina 2016).
2 SHKLOVSKY, 2016b, pp. 80.
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unconsciously, it is as if this life had never been”.3 Shklovsky 
proceeds: “Automatization eats up things, clothes, furniture, 
[your] wife and the fear of war…” To his mind, one of the crucial 
goals of art is to present things in unusual ways and thus to 
return them to consciousness, “to give back the sensation of 
life […], to make the stone stony.”4
Another source of the concept was a disagreement with the 
linguist Potebnya, a debate cognitivist in its nature. Poteb-
nya’s ideas actually had much in common with Shklovsky’s 
own, first and foremost the attention toward the reader’s mind 
(a rather novel approach in early 20th century Russia). In the 
somewhat simplified form in which Shklovsky understood Po-
tebnya, the latter regarded mental economy as the crucial goal 
of literature, and images as an aid in processing information. 
As Shklovsky puts it, Potebnya and his followers claim that 
“imagery is intended to bring together heterogonous acts and 
objects, explaining the unknown via the known”.5 The vehicle 
must thus be more familiar than the tenor.
Shklovsky sarcastically comments: “One might wonder how 
this law applies when Tyutchev compares summer lightning 
to deaf-mute demons, or when Gogol likens the sky to God’s 
chasuble”.6 He believed that fiction tended to make cognitive 
processes not easier and quicker, but more complex and pro-
longed – and thus potentially conscious. To give an example 
of ostranenie, a reference to “the incredible artificial weather 
that Earthlings sometimes create for other Earthlings when 
they don’t want those other Earthlings to inhabit Earth any 
more”7 is more difficult to process than the word “bombing,” 
and much less likely to be skimmed in semi-awareness world.8 
To show that ostranenie is not restricted to literary fiction, let 
me give another example:
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 SHKLOVSKY, 2016b, pp. 73.
6 Ibid.
7 VONNEGUT, 1991, pp. 106.
8 On religion and war made strange by Vonnegut, see: Berlina, 2017.
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As these two examples show, ostranenie can be found in 
American science-fiction or in comic strips: the fact that the 
mechanism works the same way in these texts and in Russian 
classics cited by Shklovsky – while the objects of ostranenie 
differ culturally – makes it such an interesting concept for 
comparative review. 
It must be said that the idea of deliberately making the ha-
bitual seem strange is much older than the concept of ostra-
nenie:9 Aristotle believed that poetic language must be unu-
sual, and the Romantics sought to “lift the veil from the hidden 
beauty of the world, and make familiar objects be as if they 
were not familiar”.10 Less well-known than this Romantic atti-
tude is the fact that scholars and philosophers such as Hume 
and Schlegel also believed that one of the goals of fiction was 
“rendering a familiar world from the perspective of an alien 
observer”.11 Even before that, natural philosophers tried “to see 
the banal – for example a fly – as marvelous,” for “only through 
deliberate self-estrangement could curiosity be inflamed and 
attention thereby heightened”.12 Today, the capacity for chil-





If all this is so, what was special about Shklovsky’s idea? 
Unlike the Romantics, Shklovsky saw art as a way to reawa-
ken the mind not only to the beauty of the world but also to 
its horrors. Unlike Brecht, who went on to coin the concept 
of Verfremdung after Shklovsky and perhaps under his in-
fluence,13 he did not believe that feelings should be restricted 
in order to promote critical thought. Indeed, he saw emotion 
and cognition as closely connected, prefiguring contemporary 
research.14 
Shklovsky was keenly interested in the human mind and 
used evidence from psychology and neurology in his later 
work, “formalist” close readings going hand in hand with re-
marks such as “The human brain is a very strange construc-
tion. It knows more than it knows”.15 The concept of ostranenie 
is his answer to the questions “Why do humans need fiction?” 
and “What does fiction do to our minds?” If Shklovsky lived 
today, he might well be termed a cognitivist.  
Fifty years after the publication of “Art as Device”, Shklovsky 
wrote (castigating himself, quite sincerely or not, for insuffi-
cient attention to the extratextual implications of ostranenie): 
Let us look at mankind making its way toward comprehen-
sion, let us understand wherefore we change the world, how 
we comprehend and transform it, let us place art at the head 
of the human cognitive attack. […] Thus, let us return ostra-
nenie to its functional role.16
But what is the functional role of ostranenie? To answer this, 
we need to distinguish between different varieties. Shklovsky 
never does so explicitly, though he mentions several kinds. Ju-
rij Striedter points out that ostranenie has two opposing func-
tions: “to force a new way of seeing things upon the reader,” 
but also “to steer perception toward the enstranging and com-
plicating form itself.”17 Another attempt to categorize ostrane-
13 Cf. GÜNTHER, 2001; MITCHELL, 1974.
14 Cf. e.g. STORBECK; CLORE, 2007.
15 SHKLOVSKY, 2016c, pp. 341.
16 SHKLOVSKY, 2016d, pp. 273–74.
17 STRIEDTER, 1969, pp. xxiii.
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nie was undertaken by Guy Cook, an applied linguist with a 
strong interest in cognitive science, who distinguishes “three 
areas of defamiliarization: sensory perception, text structure, 
and linguistic form”;18 however, the ostranenie of many other 
elements – ideas, concepts, customs – seems to be missing 
here. Cook himself offers a better distinction when he speaks 
of “text schemata” vs. “world schemata”.19 It is precisely the-
se schemata that ostranenie disrupts, and thus it seems most 
profitable to unite Striedter’s distinction with these terms and 
to differentiate between “ostranenie of the text” and “ostrane-
nie of the world.” 
The former variety makes strange the very language, genre, 
or literary convention that it uses; the latter makes us “see the 
world with different eyes,” as Shklovsky put it in one of his 
final articles, published when he was 90.20 “Ostranenie of the 
world” is the variety to which he seems to be ascribing the 
“functional role,” and it is arguably the one which is of grea-
ter interest to the study of psychology and cognition. I also 
suggest redefining ostranenie not as a device (as commonly 
accepted in literary studies), but as a cognitive/psychological 
effect. This effect can be achieved by different devices, and it 
only makes sense to talk of ostranenie if it is experienced by 
the reader; the devices in the text are merely a prerequisite. 
Moreover, I would like to point out that the feeling of won-
der at the habitual can arise quite without art. It seems that 
there is no term exactly corresponding to it in psychology and 
cognitive science, though “schema disruption” and “dishabi-
tuation” come close (more on this in the following). I would 
like to suggest the term “extratextual ostranenie”21 to refer to 
the feeling one has when the usual becomes seemingly stran-
ge – and at the same time more rather than less emotionally 
relevant. Suddenly wondering about the weird practice of im-
bibing another animal’s secretions (while drinking a habitual 
glass of milk), or becoming transfixed at the beauty of the hu-
man hand, or seeing one’s partner as if for the first time while 
remaining aware of all the years together – all this is extrali-




terary ostranenie. Literally failing to recognize your boyfriend 
or to perceive him as familiar (as with amnesia or the Capgras 
syndrome respectively) is not an experience anybody should 
wish for. It is the tension between familiarity and perceived 
novelty that can make life feel more real.
II. Terms and Confusions
Should you decide to continue research on ostranenie, it’s 
worth remembering that “Шкловский” is sometimes transli-
terated not as “Shklovsky”, but as “Shklovskii” or “Šklovskij”. 
However, this is nothing compared to the nomenclative ad-
ventures of his brainchild. Ostranenie is derived from the Rus-
sian strannyy (strange); it is missing a second “n” due to you-
ng Shklovsky’s orthographic idiosyncrasy. This article follows 
Viktor Shklovsky: A Reader in using the original term – for the 
sake of uniformity and clarity: the alternatives are many and 
ambiguous. So far, literary scholars and translators have used 
“making strange,” “defamiliarization,” “estrangement” and 
“enstrangement.” This last version, coined by Benjamin Sher, 
might be the best solution, but it did not catch on – even scho-
lars citing Sher tend to forget the “n” (much like Shklovsky 
did). 
“Estrangement” is associated with interpersonal estran-
gement and Marxist estrangement of the workers from their 
work; both suggest emotional disconnection and thus the 
very opposite of ostranenie. “Defamiliarization” is associated 
with a problematic translation.22 And as if all these variations 
were not enough, “foregrounding” is used almost synonymou-
sly, but usually only in regard to the ostranenie of the text. In 
short, there is enough room for confusion in the literary do-
main alone.23 
Things become even more complicated when we approach 
the intersection of literary and cognitive studies. Some lite-
rary scholars speak of “cognitive estrangement,” which sou-
nds promising for the present purpose. However, this concept, 
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which has been coined in science-fiction studies,24 is rather a 
jumble of Brecht’s Verfremdung and ostranenie.25 Guy Cook, 
whose work will be discussed below, describes the function of 
ostranenie as “schema refreshment” – which sounds as if the 
schema itself was refreshed (made more salient) rather than 
challenged. But he also speaks of “schema disruption”,26 whi-
ch seems to me a better paraphrase for ostranenie. Bearing 
these difficulties in mind, let us now venture further afield.
III. Ostranenie and its Cousins 
 in Cognitive Psychology
Often, suddenly experiencing the familiar as unfamiliar is 
a troubling sign. Accordingly, by far the most psychological 
research on such experiences deals with their problematic 
varieties. Imagine that your partner of many years suddenly 
seems unfamiliar to you. If you literally fail to recognize the 
person, this might be a case of amnesia. Or, more exotically, a 
stroke or a blow to your head might have induced prosopag-
nosia – “face blindness” – a cognitive disorder which makes 
you unable to recognize familiar faces (including your own), 
while your memory, thinking and sight remain intact. This 
would feel much like being Humpty Dumpty, who tells Alice 
he couldn’t possibly recognize her if they met again: after all, 
she has a nose in the middle of her face, and a mouth above 
it, just like everyone else. If your partner feels unfamiliar even 
though you know who they are, you might be suffering from 
yet another unusual and grave condition, the Capgras syndro-
me: the delusion that a person close to you has been replaced 
by an impostor. 
The doppelgänger – a character’s look-alike, usually evil 
– might be a literary trace of the Capgras delusion and con-
24 SUVIN, 1979.
25 Cf. SPIEGEL, 2008.
26 COOK, 1994, pp. 191.
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nected disorders (sometimes even called the doppelgänger 
syndrome), described by writers such as E.T.A. Hoffmann and 
E. A. Poe more than a hundred years before the phenomenon 
caught the attention of psychology. The parallel to ostranenie 
is clear enough: you know that something is familiar, but you 
also feel that it isn’t. But there is also a crucial difference. Suf-
fering from the psychiatric disorders described above, you feel 
disconnected; experiencing ostranenie, you feel reconnected. 
The awareness of actual familiarity is as crucial as the feeling 
of novelty. 
Dealing with faces and familiar people is just one particular 
field among many conditions in which reality is not emotio-
nally recognized as such; the umbrella terms are “derealiza-
tion” and “depersonalization”. Again, both derealization and 
ostranenie can make strange the habitual, but ostranenie 
does so in an emotionally reconnective rather than discon-
nective way. (On another vector, ostranenie has an opposite 
that is worse still, namely total automatization, the absence of 
thought and feeling – in the final analysis, the absence of life.)
Considering this, it does not seem too strange that Tolstoy 
– the Russian master of ostranenie, the one who inspired Sh-
klovsky to coin the concept – might have suffered from a mis-
sing feeling of reality. This is what Douglas Robinson argues 
in his recent book Estrangement and the Somatics of Litera-
ture. “Estrangement for Tolstoy,” he writes, “was a debilitating 
psychological disorder—what the psychiatric community re-
fers to as depersonalization”.27 In as far as one can diagnose 
a dead man (mainly on the basis of his writing, and without 
formal training in psychology), there are good reasons to side 
with Robinson. However – even though opposite extremes can 
be close – subsuming the literary effect and the psychological 
problem under the same title is misleading. The writer might 
have felt disconnected, but what he created (perhaps partly as 
a form of self-medication) was reconnection. Literary charac-
ters, too, may feel depersonalized even while providing exactly 
the opposite experience to the reader.28 The intriguing ques-
tion is: can ostranenie work therapeutically? How far does it 
reach out on the connection-disconnection continuum? It can 
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pull you up from the middle ground, certainly, but how about 
the clinical cases of “derealization” and “depersonalization”? 
There have, in fact, been some attempts (very few and very 
recent) to treat these conditions using methods that bear 
some resemblance to ostranenie: “mindfulness-based cogni-
tive therapy” and, to a lesser degree, “schema therapy.” Both 
are forms of treating psychiatric and psychological disorders 
developed at the end of the 20th century and showing a key 
similarity to ostranenie – though their developers never men-
tion Shklovsky. The similarity consists in the belief that auto-
matisms can be hurtful. This idea, of course, has a long history 
in psychology, from the Freudian exploration of the subcons-
cious to various cognitive approaches (as pioneered by Beck, 
1975) – but “mindfulness” and “schema therapy” are particu-
larly close to Shklovsky’s ideas.
Let us begin with the concept of or Mindfulness-Based Cog-
nitive Therapy, MBCT for short (the term “deautomatization” 
is also occasionally used). This approach views awareness 
as the prerequisite of happiness and creativity. Practitioners 
such as Jon Kabat-Zinn and Ellen Langer argue that automa-
tism is deadening to feelings and consciousness. The con-
cept of mindfulness stresses the sense of concentrating on 
the present, consciously and non-judgmentally experiencing 
thoughts, feelings, and sensations.  But while ostranenie can 
involve anything from your body to the most abstract ideas, 
mindfulness tends to deal with the immediate environment. 
What unites them is that both are methods of counteracting 
what Shklovsky calls “automatization” and what MBCT calls 
“mindlessness.” Shklovsky, who disliked all things esoteric, 
would have criticized the New Age associations of the con-
cept – still, there are clear parallels here. 
The goal of ostranenie is to replace the automatic recogni-
tion of schemas with conscious experience.29 Schemas are an 
29 There is some evidence that schemas are re-created and changed every time they are 
activated, like memories. This makes the picture more complicated, but this outside of the 
present scope of study.
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integral component of our thinking, and it is only logical that 
by far the most psychological studies only discuss “cognitive 
schema disruption” in regard to traumatic experiences. As far 
as I could find, no concept of schema subversion or disruption 
in cognitive studies and psychology quite corresponds to os-
tranenie. There are, instead, several approaches which encap-
sulate different aspects of it. One of them is schema therapy 
(also known as SFT, schema-focused therapy). Developed by 
Jeffrey Young in the early 1990s, it was meant to help patients 
who suffered from personality disorders. The idea was to 
identify “negative schemas” of thought and to practice critical 
awareness of them. 
SFT does not concern itself with the sense of novelty or 
wonder. Moreover, it radically differs from ostranenie by res-
tricting the number of schemas to eighteen, all of them ma-
ladaptive and stemming from childhood experiences.30 Part 
of the therapy is “cognitive restructuring,” which can involve 
attempts to see the situation from another perspective – po-
tentially a form of ostranenie. But it only concerns a very res-
tricted number of “maladaptive thought patterns” – a use far 
more restrictive even than “mindfulness,” and immeasurably 
more restrictive than ostranenie. Besides, though Shklovsky 
does particularly abhor some automatized views (such as that 
killing is fine if your country tells you so), it is the automati-
zation itself – rather than any particular content or “pattern” 
– that he finds most dangerous. 
Considering the origin of the concept, it is no wonder that 
many psychological and cognitive approaches to it deal with 
language and literature. In the 1990s, while Young was wor-
king on schema therapy, the cognitive linguist Guy Cook de-
veloped another kind of schema theory in his book Discourse 
and Literature: the Interplay of Form and Mind – in this case, 
explicitly and effectively working with the concept of ostrane-
nie (which he calls “defamiliarization”). Cook argues that any 
cognitive theory needs to take into account literary texts, as 
they “perform the important function of breaking down exis-
30 YOUNG, 1994.
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ting schemata, reorganizing them and building new ones”.31 
He is well aware, though, that ostranenie can also exist outsi-
de literature. Cook convincingly criticizes one of the shortco-
mings of formalism, namely that it presents “a theory of litera-
ture as deviation from a norm. Yet it fails to identify the norm 
by which this variation is defined”.32 It is crucial to identify 
the changing norms and schemata (scripts, concepts) against 
which ostranenie works. 
Discourse and Literature has built a robust bridge from Sh-
klovsky to cognitive science. Unfortunately, far too few peo-
ple use it. Those who do tend to be linguists, such as Elena 
Semino. She positions her approach as cognitive,33 and re-
fers to a key text in psychology, Bartlett’s Remembering, as 
the originator of the concept of schemata. Semino does not 
mention Shklovsky, but it is quite interesting that Bartlett’s 
book, just like Tolstoy’s diary entry that inspired “Art as De-
vice,” deals with the interaction of habit and memory. To use 
contemporary terms, automatization is essential for procedu-
ral (unconscious) memory, while ostranenie can help create 
declarative (conscious) memories. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, ostranenie might well prove to be a productive concept in 
memory studies.
Within literary studies, the first forays into ostranenie and 
empirical psychology/cognitive studies were undertaken in 
the 1980s (beginning with Peer, 1986).  Soon, many empirical 
studies on “foregrounding” and related phenomena followed 
(to repeat, this term usually implies ostranenie of the text – ar-
guably the variety that is less productive for cognitive psycho-
logy). The fact that “foregrounded” passages produce longer 
reading times and higher ratings of strikingness and affect34 
may not be particularly surprising; still, there is perhaps more 
empirical reader-response research on ostranenie than on 
31 COOK, 1994, pp. 10.
32 Ibid., pp. 138.
33 SEMINO, 1995, pp. 79.




any other literary effect. Moreover, it has been argued in ad-
dition that ostranenie enhances the cooperation of the brain 
hemispheres.35 Recently, research36 has shown how the brain 
reacts to “defamiliarization” (the preferred term in psycholo-
gy, often used seemingly without awareness of Shklovsky’s 
work). Another contemporary study37 found that people stron-
gly underestimated their own pleasure in rediscovering or-
dinary, mundane (rather than extraordinary) experiences of 
their lives. Here, a trace of ostranenie was created simply by 
virtue of passing time. 
A much-cited article published in Science in 2013 demons-
trated a correlation between reading “literary fiction” and a 
better-developed theory of mind. Science is a renowned jour-
nal, and when I first saw the abstract, I thought a new era was 
coming for ostranenie: “defamiliarization” is cited as the defi-
ning feature of literariness used in setting up the research pa-
rameters.38 However, it turned out that the authors only appea-
red to be familiar with Shklovsky’s concept second-hand. 
Accordingly, on the next page they describe the experiment as 
follows: “we selected literary works of fiction by award-win-
ning or canonical writers and compared their effects on ToM 
with reading nonfiction, popular fiction, or nothing at all.” The 
study does not even list the chosen texts, but it is safe to say 
that “award-winning and canonical writing” need not neces-
sarily be conductive to ostranenie. 
It is gratifying to see an empirical study confirm the thesis 
that fiction is a ToM-training tool, as it has been developed 
by cognitive literary scholars (such as Zunshine, 2006), but 
it would be premature to see the study by Kidd and Castano 
as an indication that ostranenie specifically matters for ToM. 
Even if the study did use ostranenie-rich fiction, there would 
still be the matter of correlation and causation. As it is, all we 
can say is that the reading of fictional minds trains the rea-
35 ALEXANDROV, 2007, pp. 108-109.
36 BOHTN et al., 2012; DEK et al., 2015.
37 ZHANG et al., 2014.
38 KIDD; CASTANO, 2013, pp. 377.
57
Ostranenie: To give back the sensation of life
ding of real minds (the mental process, after all, is much the 
same), and that the reading of particularly strange minds – 
ostranenie often involves the perspectives of time and space 
travelers, animals, etc. – might well be a form of ToM exercise 
deserving further study.
An overview of empirical studies investigating the rela-
tionship between reading and empathy / ToM was published 
in 2015,39 drawing on several earlier overviews but also adding 
new material and fundamental reflections. It would make no 
sense to sum up this detailed and readily accessible article 
here; one section (4.2.), though, deserves particular attention. 
Entitled “defamiliarization,” it convincingly argues that ostra-
nenie plays a crucial and underappreciated role in the discus-
sion of empathy and fiction. 
None of the empirical studies explicitly differentiate bet-
ween ostranenie of the world and ostranenie of the text. When 
Koopman and Hakemulder write that “fore grounded features 
in the text (e. g., novel metaphors, rhyme) can lead to aesthe-
tic feelings of perceived beauty, but particularly surprise and 
defamiliarization,”40 they are talking about ostranenie of the 
text. They proceed with a graph that shows “foregrounding” as 
a source of self-reflection and, in a potential next step, self-a-
wareness and self-change. However, it is actually ostranenie 
of the world that stands a much better chance to provoke self-
-reflection. It is not to be denied that encountering an unusual 
rhyme may lead to the conscious observation “well, this is an 
unusual rhyme!” and then perhaps to the awareness of one’s 
own role as a reader. Still, surprised reflection about one’s own 
life seems much more probable when encountering passages 
such as these, to quote some books published between 1623 
and 2014 in different languages and countries and dealing 
with matters ranging from ships to mobile phones:
There they told me to enter a certain little cottage made of 
planks. It did not stand on the ground, nor was it based on 
a foundation, nor was it underpinned by braces, columns or 
39 KOOPMAN; HAKEMULDER, 2015.
40 Ibid., section 4.2.
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supports. Rather, it rested on the water and wobbled to and 
fro […]41
I believe few people have thought much upon the strange 
multitude of little things necessary in the providing, produ-
cing, curing, dressing, making, and finishing this one article 
of bread.42 
He looked at the approaching Frenchmen, and though but 
a moment before he had been galloping to get at them and 
hack them to pieces, their proximity now seemed so awful 
that he could not believe his eyes. “Who are they? Why are 
they running? Can they be coming at me? And why? To kill 
me? Me whom everyone is so fond of?”43 
the fiddlers drew their rosined horse-hair across the stret-
ched intestines of lambs44  
I tend to think of human beings as huge, rubbery test tu-
bes, too, with chemical reactions seething inside.45 
Not too far above the steep canyons there had hung an 
imperial backdrop of calm, blue distance, in which extrava-
gantly lovely white creatures — fat, sleepy things – hove-
red.46 
I deliberately chose very different works to show what rich 
food ostranenie offers for comparatists. Let us look at the au-
thors: Comenius was a 17th century Czech theologian; Defoe 
an English 18th century journalist; Tolstoy a 19th century Rus-
sian pacifist; Huxley a 20th century British intellectual; Von-
negut and Amis – American (and British-American) 20-21st 
century writers with an affinity for the fantastic. 
All of them create ostranenie  thus disproving the sugges-
tion famously made by Hansen-Löve47 that it appears almost 
exclusively in works of the Russian avantgarde – but their 
goals and/or the readers’ reactions may well different. For 
41 COMENIUS, 1998 [1623], pp. 88.
42 DEFOE, 2003 [1719], pp. 94.
43 TOLSTOY, 2016 [1869], chapter XIX, final paragraph.
44 HUXLEY, 2009 [1928], pp. 31.
45 VONNEGUT, 2010 [1973], pp. 4.
46 AMIS, 1994 [1981], pp. 17.
47 HANSEN-LÖVE, 1978, pp. 21.
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instance, both Comenius and Defoe express wonder at human 
creations – ships and bread respectively. However, when a 
Christian philosopher talks about the insecure footing of a sea 
voyager, one is tempted to read this as a metaphor for earthly 
life, while Defoe’s admiration of the achievement that is baked 
bread appears to be straightforward. After all, he was a pioneer 
of economic journalism; in fact, his enumeration is reminis-
cent of Leonard Read’s seminal essay “I, Pencil” published 230 
years later and enumerating the complexities of producing an 
object as simple as a pencil. 
The two writers’ devices, too, are different in this case. Co-
menius describes the ship without naming it, as if he had no 
word for it. The narrative is autobiographical; he had indeed 
never seen a ship before – still, the device is used consciously: 
he could have said “ship,” but by refraining from doing so he 
forces readers to engage in a bottom-up cognitive process (re-
construction) instead of a top-down one (recognition). Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe verbalizes and shares his sense of wonder 
and enumerates that which usually goes unmentioned. Ulti-
mately, the two passages’ long-term effect on the reader may 
be similar: finding myself eating a bagel in an airport, I might 
find myself newly grateful for the marvel of bread and won-
dering what Comenius, with his amazement at ships, would 
have to say about airplanes. When such different devices can 
work in such similar ways, it does indeed appear to make sen-
se to regard ostranenie as an effect (rather than a particular 
device.) 
So far, we have looked at the techniques and effects of os-
tranenie. What about its objects? They, too, can differ vastly. In 
the first two examples, we are dealing with man-made things; 
Huxley, too, can be said to talk about violins – but arguably the 
ultimate object is “music.” Tolstoy’s object is “war” – or “kil-
ling people”. Vonnegut describes the human organism, Amis 
– clouds. I only selected examples that make strange the out-
side world rather than the text itself: firstly, because I feel the 
latter variety (aka “foregrounding”) is overrepresented in re-
search, and secondly, because the former one (that I call “os-




Like Tolstoy – Shklovsky’s primary example – Vonnegut 
and Amis are particularly prone to make strange the world. It 
is perhaps not a matter of chance that Vonnegut is associated 
with science fiction, and Amis with “Martian poetry,” a mo-
vement whose main goal was showing things as strange, as 
if through a space alien’s eyes. In his “Taxonomy of the Emo-
tions of Literary Response,” the cognitive psychologist Keith 
Oatley goes as far as calling ostranenie “The Amis Effect”.48 
Citing phrases from Amis’ Money such as the zeugma “This 
restaurant serves no drink, this one serves no meat, this one 
serves no homosexuals”,49 Oatley observes the “incongruous 
juxtapositions which do not allow easy assimilation of this 
material to a schema.”50 Again, the examples provided – such 
as the one above – mostly feature the ostranenie of text and 
language: it is not so much the restaurant business that is 
being de-automatized here as the verb “serve.” However, such 
juxtapositions can also function to make strange the world. 
Often used in jokes, they are connected to the cognitive con-
cepts of “bisociation”51 and “conceptual blending”;52 studying 
the connections between conceptual blending and ostranenie 
could be a worthwhile endeavor. Oatley concludes that “lite-
rary simulation, which runs on minds rather than on compu-
ters” might be just as useful to cognitive science as computer 
simulation.53 Ostranenie, then, could turn out to be a particu-
larly productive piece of software.
Apart from “the Amis effect” (admittedly a tongue-in-cheek 
nickname rather than a seriously suggested term), Oatley calls 
ostranenie “dishabituation” (passim), which brings us to yet 
another term in cognitive psychology. “Dishabituation” refers 
to “a change in a familiar stimulus that prompts us to start no-
48 OATLEY, 1995, pp. 58.
49 AMIS, 1985, pp. 168.
50 OATLEY, 1995, pp. 59.
51 KOESTLER, 1964.
52 FAUCONNIER; TURNER, 2008.
53 OATLEY, 1995, pp. 72.
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ticing the stimulus again”.54 The textbook just cited proceeds 
to explain that habituation (automatization) is a necessary 
cognitive mechanism, but that it also can lead to slips and 
inattentiveness;55 in such cases, dishabituation can be help-
ful. The book addresses students, and Sternberg suggests that 
it might combat boredom during a lecture: “Try noticing other 
aspects of your instructor, like hand gestures or body move-
ments, while still paying attention to the content.”56 Imagine 
a film showing the lecturer’s hand or mouth in close-up while 
he or she talks: this shift of attention is bordering on the sur-
real, and on ostranenie. A 2014 article on dishabituation con-
cludes that its “magnitude determined by the current arousal 
level”.57 It is, then, connected to emotion, as is ostranenie. 
Does all this mean that “dishabituation” is the cognitive 
term for ostranenie? Not quite. Firstly, it is mostly studied in 
regard to processes and tasks, rather than concepts and ideas, 
“things, clothes, furniture, your wife and the fear of war” (to re-
turn to that famous Shklovskyan phrase) – and often it is de-
fined as concerning only the most elementary, unconditioned 
responses, such as a dog salivating at the smell of food (rather 
than the ring of a bell).  Secondly, the general view is that both 
habituation and dishabituation “occur automatically” and “re-
quire no conscious effort”.58 Thirdly, dishabituation is a matter 
of renewing responses (emotional at most, often purely phy-
siological), hardly ever a matter of cognition.
“Disinhibition” and “sensitization” are not the same as os-
tranenie, either. There seems, then, to be no exact equivalent 
of ostranenie in psychology or cognitive studies. 
As a different scholar whose name also happens to be Ster-
54 STERNBERG, R., 2008, pp. 532.
55 Ibid., pp. 73.
56 Ibid., pp. 74.
57 STEINER; BARRY, 2014, pp. 79.
58 STERNBERG, R., 2008, pp. 72. However, Sternberg’s own lecture example does depict a 
conscious effort, and it seems worthwhile to study such efforts – leaps of imagination, cog-
nitive frame shifts – as they take place when reading, watching a film or simply consciously 
taking a new look at life.
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nberg recently observed, “from an interdisciplinary view, [os-
tranenie] offers an attractive meeting ground”.59 While he is 
talking about different schools of literary study, what he says 
also holds true for comparative approaches, as well as for the 
study of the human mind. The ways literature (as well as films 
and other cultural projects from songs to comic strips) helps 
to experiencing the familiar afresh is especially intriguing in 
comparatist terms: the effect combines a seemingly universal 
cognitive background with a great deal of cultural variety.
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